

**SPEECH FOR THE NA**

It is still possible, even in Washington, to come upon persons to whom name Central Intelligence Agency suggests very little or means nothing at all. This is as it should be. At the same time, the creation and development of a national intelligence agency have inevitably been accompanied by a certain amount of national interest, so that those citizens who read newspapers, watch TV or listen to their radios realize that something new has been added to the government whose activities are of considerable significance.

The word "intelligence" is associated in the public mind with the word "spy", and the word "spy" with such words as "glamor" about which the less said the better. Consequently one would guess, without going to the trouble of conducting a scientific survey of opinion, that the concept of "Central Intelligence" must be quite interesting as compared with the truth.

This does not, of course, apply to the members of your CIO Association who are completely aware of the nature of intelligence and counter-intelligence. Nevertheless, it may be well to review briefly where the Central Intelligence Agency stands with relation to the United States Government and what purposes it is designed to serve.

The law which established the Agency (the National Security Act of 1947, Section 102 (d)) makes it, above all, an Agent of the National Security Council, the President's principal advisory group on matters of foreign policy. The Agency is directed to advise the Council concerning intelligence activities of the government that relate to national security; to make recommendations to the Council regarding the "coordination" of governmental intelligence activities; to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" (which, however, will be primarily intelligence

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furnished by other agencies of the government than CIA); to perform, for the benefit of these other agencies, such services of common concern as may be more efficiently accomplished centrally, and to perform such other functions as the National Security Council may direct.

In addition to these statements of function, there are three provisos in the Law: that the Agency shall have no internal police powers in the United States; that the "existing" Agencies shall continue to do their own intelligence work, and that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting sources and methods of intelligence. The first of these is of obvious importance and should be borne in mind by any person giving thought to the problem of Central Intelligence.

What is interesting about all this, and what may not be altogether clear to some casual observers is that the Agency, as established by law, is not so much an activity in itself as an integrating organism related to the activities of others. It takes the product of others, and, with their help, attempts to translate it into material relevant to the formation of national policy. It makes recommendations to the National Security Council on how to get the best results from instrumentalities of intelligence in existence and which may be created. It stands ready itself to undertake services that cannot satisfactorily be performed in any one part of the intelligence structure of the government but can best be done by all working together under a single head.

In other words, gentlemen, the wartime intelligence structure of the government, as you know it ten years ago, is still relatively intact. G-2 provides intelligence to the Army as it has always done, including counter-intelligence. ONI is still the source of naval intelligence. CIA comes into

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the picture where intelligence is "related to the national security" which means that it is more than of Army concern, or Navy concern, or State concern but must be considered by all three, as well as by other Agencies including the FBI; correlated as among all concerned, and passed on to the National Security Council as material related to the foreign policy of the United States.

Since CIA has a part in the collection of intelligence, it must also be interested in counterespionage. This does not, of course, affect the operations of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps which continues its usual activities. Under agreed policies providing for full cooperation, CIA and the CIC have operated in harmony, each supplementing the activities of the other. What the creation of CIA does in this field is primarily to make certain that full use of counterintelligence shall be made for national as well as purely Army purposes.

To summarize, when the President created a Central Intelligence Group eight years ago, and when the Congress made the Group an Agency seven years ago, they established an organization to provide material for the safety of America. What the President and the Congress recognized was that we must never again allow ourselves to be ambushed as at Pearl Harbor because our various intelligence agencies were working independently at cross purposes. The problem was to integrate intelligence for recognized and sensible goals, all related to the ultimate safety of the nation. Central Intelligence was the answer.

Although the functions of Central Intelligence are primarily supervisory, its job is no less big or important. The Director of Central Intelligence has an enormous responsibility. For one thing, he must direct an Agency of the government which is no mean job in itself. But far more to the point is his

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responsibility to make sure that adequate intelligence is available to the government and that it is so used, understood, and distributed that national disaster cannot be the product of a failure of intelligence. In a world so constituted as ours in the 1950's, it must be evident that today there is no substitute as there was when events and machines moved slower for intelligence as a first line of defense.

Allen W. Dulles, the present Director, has the confidence of the National Security Council to which he reports and merits yours as well. His experience in the intelligence field goes back over at least thirty years. He was one of those principally concerned with the formation of CIA and has watched it closely from the beginning. His brilliant record with OSS during the war is well known; his achievements as Deputy Director and Director of Central Intelligence over the past three years are generally unknown as perforce they must be. It is safe for me to say that they are very considerable.

He and his predecessors, Admiral Sidney Souers, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, and General Walter Bedell Smith, have all faced an exceedingly intricate and difficult job in building up the instrument of government outlined in general terms by the President and the Congress. It may be said with confidence that as a result of strenuous efforts not only on the part of the Directors but those under their command and those in other agencies cooperating with them, an organization has been achieved today of which the USA should be proud. It would be as foolish to say today as it would have been before 1941 that a Pearl Harbor in one form or another cannot possibly happen to the United States, but there is no question whatever that we are better protected in that regard now than we have ever been before in our history.

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That intelligence in any form must operate in secrecy and seclusion goes without saying. The American people recognize the necessity for a secret agency carrying on far flung overseas activities. You have every right to be confident that the intelligence business which all of you have reason to understand will be well and successfully conducted and will play its full part in the maintenance of our security in this extremely uncertain world.



SPEECH FOR THE NATIONAL COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS ASSOCIATION

- date?  
7/8/54

NOTE: It is assumed that [redacted] will furnish his own introductory remarks, jokes, and the like.

It is still possible, even in Washington, to come upon persons <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ whom the name Central Intelligence Agency ~~means nothing~~ suggests ~~nothing~~ very little or means nothing at all. This is as it should be. At the same time, a national intelligence agency the creation and development of ~~Central Intelligence Agency~~ <sup>interest</sup> have inevitably been accompanied by a certain amount of national ~~publicity~~ <sup>interest</sup>, so that those citizens who <sup>watch TV</sup> read their papers or listen to their radios ~~with reasonable ease~~ realize that something new has been added to the government whose activities are of considerable significance.

~~Exactly what the average newspaper reader believes this~~ <sup>however</sup> ~~new Agency to be~~ may be another question. The sort of publicity that will appear about such an organization ~~is likely to suggest more than the facts warrant.~~ The humdrum day-to-day activities of an intelligence agency ~~will~~ differ little in news value from those of any other branch of the government. It will only be when the name of the Agency <sup>G</sup> can be connected with events of general public interest that ~~a newspaper~~ <sup>will mention it.</sup> ~~the newspaper~~ <sup>will mention it.</sup> ~~generally read.~~ Furthermore, the word "intelligence" is associated in the public mind with the word "spy", and the word "spy" is ~~cognate~~ <sup>associated</sup>

with ~~the word~~ such words as "glamor" about which the less said the better.

The law which established the Agency (the National Security Act of 1947.

Section 102 (d) makes it, above all, an Agent of the National Security Council, the President's principal advisory group on matters of foreign policy. The Agency is directed to advise the Council concerning intelligence activities of the government that relate to national security; to make recommendations to the Council regarding the "coordination" of governmental intelligence activities; to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" (which, however, will be primarily intelligence furnished ~~by existing agencies of the~~ by other agencies of the government than CIA); to perform, for the benefit of these other agencies, such services of common concern as may be more efficiently accomplished centrally, and to perform such other functions as the National Security Council may direct.

In addition to the statements of function ~~in the law~~, there are three  
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provisos that the Agency shall have no internal police powers in the United States;

that ~~what the Act calls~~ the "existing" Agencies shall continue to do their own

intelligence work, and that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be respon-

sible for protecting ~~the~~ sources and methods of intelligence ~~involved~~. The first of  
these is of obvious importance and should be recognized by any person giving  
thought to the problem of Central Intelligence.

What is interesting about all this, and what may not be altogether clear to

*Some*  
all casual observers ~~of the national scene~~, is that the Agency, as established by

an integrating organism related to  
law, is not so much an activity in itself as ~~exercising power~~ for the activities of

others. It takes the product of others, and, with their help, attempts to ~~make~~ translate

it into material relevant to the formation of national policy.

~~It watches all parts of the government concerned with intelligence~~

*It*  
~~It~~ makes recommendations to the National Security Council

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cannot satisfactorily be performed in any one part of the intelligence structure of

the government but can best be done by all/together ~~working~~ working under a single head.

In other words, gentlemen, the wartime intelligence structure of the government  
as you knew it ten years ago, is still relatively intact, ~~and is still~~

G-2 provides intelligence to the Army as it has always done, including ~~intelligence~~

~~of domestic character~~ and Army counter-intelligence, ~~much of which must be of~~



~~a domestic character, denied by law to CIA even if CIA were interested in it.~~

CIA comes into the picture where intelligence is "related to the national security"

which means that it is more than of Army concern, or Navy Concern, or State concern

as well as  
but must be considered by all three, ~~possibly~~ by other Agencies including the FBI;

correlated as among all concerned, and passed on to the National Security Council

material related ~~to~~  
as ~~it relates~~ to the foreign policy of the United States.

Since ~~the~~ CIA has a part in the collection of intelligence, it must also be interested in counterespionage. This does not, of course, affect the operations of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps which continues its usual activities. Under agreed policies providing for full cooperation, CIA and the CIC have operated in complete harmony, each supplementing the activities of the other. What the creation of CIA does in this field is primarily to make certain that full use of counter-intelligence shall be made for national as well as purely Army purposes.

What I have said so far relates to the most open to attack. It does not do.

To summarize,

in 1949, when the President created a Central Intelligence Group eight years ago,

the Group

and when the Congress made it an Agency seven years ago, they did not establish

to be the

any Super-Spy organization as it has come to be called which was to provide the

~~For all national~~ ~~clocks and the dangers~~ ~~and~~ ~~to provide future~~ ~~material for~~

*the safety of America*  
~~television shorts specializing in international intrigue.~~ What the President and the Congress recognized was that we must never again allow ourselves to be ambushed as at Pearl Harbor because our various ~~independent~~ intelligence agencies were working ~~for independent and various purposes~~ independently at cross purposes. The ~~problem~~ *problem?* was to integrate intelligence for recognized and sensible ~~independent~~ goals, all related to the ultimate safety of the nation. Central Intelligence was the answer.

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 But although ~~the~~ functions/are primarily supervisory, its job is no less big or important. The Director of Central Intelligence has an enormous responsibility. For one thing, he must direct an Agency of the government which is no mean job in itself. But far more to the point is his ~~responsibility~~ *responsibility* to make sure that ~~the~~ *equat* intelligence <sup>is</sup> and that it <sup>and that it</sup> is so used, understood, and distributed that national disaster cannot be the product of a failure of intelligence. *It is* <sup>must</sup> evident to ~~anyone~~ *that* In a world so constituted as ours in the 1950's, *that Today* there is no substitute, as there ~~was~~ *was* when events and machines moved slower, for intelligence as a first line of defense.

*Allen W. Dulles* has the *Natural* confidence ~~and~~ of the Security Council to which he reports, and merits yours as well. His experience in the intelligence field goes back

formation of CIA and has watched it closely from the beginning. His brilliant record with OSS during the war is well known; his achievements as Deputy Director and Director of Central Intelligence over the past three years are <sup>generally unknown</sup> ~~less well known~~ as perforce they must be. It is safe for me to say that they are very considerable.

He and his predecessors, <sup>Admiral</sup> ~~/~~ Sidney Souers, <sup>General</sup> ~~/~~ Hoyt Vandenberg, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, and General <sup>Walter</sup> ~~Bedell~~ Smith, have all faced an exceedingly intricate and difficult job in building up the instrument of government outlined in general terms by the President and the Congress. ~~that they could not have had and did not have smooth sailing is self-evident. That perfection has not been reached is also self-evident.~~ It may be said with confidence, ~~however,~~ that as a result of strenuous efforts not only on the part of the Directors but those under their command and those in other agencies cooperating with them, an organization has been achieved today <sup>of which the U S A should be proud</sup> ~~which is probably much more than any taxpayer has any right to expect~~ in so short a period of time as eight years. It would be as foolish to say today as it would have been ~~in 1941~~ before 1941 that a Pearl Harbor in one form or another cannot possibly happen to the United States, but there is no question whatever that we are better protected in that regard now than we have ever been before in our history.

That intelligence in any form must operate in secrecy and seclusion goes

without saying. ~~It is sometimes irksome to the American people that this must~~  
~~be so, but in the long run, the American people recognize that it is so and that~~  
~~the time arrived long since when they must be~~ *the necessity* ~~burdened if you like~~ *for a*  
carrying on *operations* ~~secret agency with far flung and unknown activities~~ *which they cannot know very much*  
~~Intelligence Agency will receive support, continue to receive support and will be~~  
~~allowed to operate without undue interference. Under these circumstances, you~~  
have every right to be confident that the intelligence business which all of you  
have reason to understand, will be well and successfully conducted and will play  
its full part in the maintenance of our security in this extremely uncertain world.

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